F-GA4 FUEL DISPENSER

F-GA4 FUEL DISPENSER

Pump Type: Optional

Inlet Pressure :>=54kPa.

Flow rate (L/min.) :55±5

Suction Distance (m) :6(verticalmente) / 50(orizzontalmente)

FlowMeter Type : Optional

Accuracy :±0.2%

Motor :Voltage(V) 110V/220V/380V,50Hz/60Hz

Capacity(hp) :1HP(0.75kw)

Input Voltage :110V/220V/380V,50Hz/60Hz

Nozzle : Auto Shut-off Nozzle

Environmental Condition : -40~~+55degree

Control Type: Solenold Vale Control Type

Preset :Function Provided(Small LCDIndicator)

Display(Counter) :Type LCD and Bright Backlight

Digit of Volume : 0~~999,999(6 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Amount : 0~~999,999(6 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Unit price : 0~~9999(4 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Total Range :0~~99,999,999,99

Optional :Display Type LCD and Bright Backlight

Digit of Volume : 0~~99,999,999(8 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Amount : 0~~99,999,999(8 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Unit price: 0~~999999(6 Digits),Decimal point can be changed

Digit of Total Range :0~~99,999,999,99

Totalizer :1~~9,999,999

Hose :4.5m

Weight :350kg

Dimension(L×W×H) :1660*660*2190(mm)

Dimension(L×W×H)Of Qty of Container :40ft: 17

ion without authorization; illegal disassemble or modify IC card so as to change data. Apart from the above methods there are some professional attacks mainly for operating system. IC card intellectual Prevention technology mainly contains two aspects: one is for IC card itself including physical safety; the other is for information exchange process. In order to ensure the physical safety of IC card, some safety technologies are adopted in manufacture of card base, such as laser engraving, fluorescent printing and macroline technology. As for possible attacks, chip manufacturers have researched many methods: Inspection of exterior voltage; Inspection of low frequency o fuel dispenser f clock; Preventing information of data bus being pick through supervision programme; Protecting memory by logical encryption; Fuse protection; Mounting encrypted calculating processor for chip. The above safety technologies are belongs to hardware aspect. Whichever technology provided for hardware platform, the prevention technologies of differential power analysis (DPA) and simple power analysis (SPA) should be considered in software. COS sa fuel dispenser fety mechanism The purpose of COS safety protection aims at protection information on card and exchanged between terminal and card. Therefore, safety mechanism should be able to effectively control information, which is considered in two aspects: One is to control the right to operate information, that is, who is authorized to operate information; the other is to process information itself, that is, encryption processing by which unauthorized person is unknown to its contents, even though he or she has got information. Other methods include: adopting enhanced Data Encryption Standard (DES) calculation in operating system; memory adopts special encryption; employing specific I/O technique to prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. The control of right to operation of COS basically is divided into two categories: authentication mechanism and safety report mechanism. In real appli fuel dispenser

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ld it ever emerge that a rogue state, or terrorist group, has used illegally diverted material to make and let off a crude nuclear weapon, or even a less spectacular “dirty�radiological device, the power industry s hope of a nuclear future would be among the many victims. Fear of fuel diversion is growing, along with fear of proliferation in general. North Korea did a rogue- bomb test last month; suspicion of Iran s nuclear plans is mounting; al-Qaeda is seeking nuclear material. Meanwhile the apostles of nuclear power confer at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, the UN s nuclear guardian) and elsewhere, to work out how to secure nuclear material and know- fuel dispenser how. Imagine the reaction, in this tense climate, if it was found that enough plutonium for several crude bombs had gone missing. Welcome to the so-called “back end�of nuclear-fuel management, where that much and more has collectively been “lost�at one time or another over the past decade at plants in Britain and France that separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel. (Japan has had similar discrepancies at a plant that blends plutonium with u fuel dispenser ranium to make mixed-oxide fuel.) On closer examination, such losses usually reflect bad book-keeping. But inspection of furred-up pipes and recalculations to make the books balance can take months. The sheer volume of material being processed makes it impossible to be sure none has been pilfered the IAEA says it takes only 8kg (17.6lb) of plutonium and 25kg of highly enriched uranium to make a bomb; others say less. And inspectors cannot always count on co-operation. Like a pantomime horse, the nuclear industry has an ugly “front end�too. The cascades of centrifuge machines spun to enrich uranium gas to 5% or so, for use as fuel in civilian reactors, can—with tinkering—enrich to the 90% needed for bombs. And it is tough to stop small but militarily useful amounts of uranium being diverted for illicit purposes. Hence the fears over Iran, which claims to need fuel dispenser